

ANALYSIS AND VULNERABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT TRADE NETWORK

E. Gutiérrez-Moya^{a*}, B. Adenso-Díaz^b, and S. Lozano^a

^a Department of Industrial Management, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain

egm@us.es; slozano@us.es

^b Engineering School, Campus Gijón, Universidad de Oviedo, Spain

adenso@uniovi.es

* Corresponding author:

Postal address: Department of Industrial Management, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain

E-mail: egm@us.es

Phone: +34 954486198

PAPER PUBLISHED IN FOOD SECURITY, 13, pp113-128

Doi: 10.1007/s12571-020-01117-9

Abstract

Wheat is one of the three basic cereals providing the necessary calorific intake for most of the world's population. For this reason, its trade is critical to many countries in order to fulfil their internal demand and strategic stocks. In this paper, we use complex network analysis tools to study the international wheat trade network and its evolving characteristics for the period 2009-2013. To understand the vulnerability of each country's dependence on the imports of this crop we have performed different analyses, simulating shocks of varying intensities for the main wheat producers, and observed the population affected by the production drop. As a result, we conclude that globally the network is slightly more resilient than four years previously, although at the same time some developing countries have slipped into a vulnerable situation. We have also analysed the effects of a global shock affecting all major producers, assessing its impact on every country. Some comments on the COVID-19 outbreak and the political decisions taken by governments following the pandemic declaration are included, observing that given their capital-intensive characteristics, no negative effects should currently be expected in the wheat market.

Keywords: Global wheat trade; Complex network analysis; Supply shocks; Food crises; Vulnerability.

33 **1. INTRODUCTION**

34 Historically, wheat has been the basic crop in western countries. In fact, today it is
35 the third largest produced cereal (after rice and corn) and the second largest (after rice)
36 for human consumption worldwide (FAO, 2018). Regarding the calorific content of the
37 human diet, wheat represents the highest percentage of calories (20.4% according to data
38 of 2009, D’Odorico *et al.*, 2014). For this reason, everything related to its production and
39 trade is of paramount importance to millions of people who have wheat as their basic
40 daily sustenance.

41 As the world population grows and the demand for bio fuels increase, the price of
42 wheat has risen dramatically for some time. In addition, periodic cases of adverse weather
43 conditions have meant that not only is it more expensive for countries to buy the required
44 wheat, but in some cases there have been shortages, generating political instability in
45 various parts of the world. The social movements in Northern Africa and East Asia (the
46 so-called “Arab Spring”) confirm this statement, changing the geopolitical reality in those
47 regions as a result of a heat wave affecting production in Russia (d’Amour *et al.*, 2016).

48 Unfortunately, this variability in weather conditions, increases in temperature,
49 extreme rainfall and the presence of droughts, tend to occur more and more frequently.
50 Fraser *et al.* (2013) used some hydrological models to identify the regions more exposed
51 to climatic stress considering different cereals. Regarding wheat, the regions more
52 exposed to droughts and with a reduced adaptability capacity are southeast USA,
53 southeast South America, northeast Mediterranean region and Central Asia.

54 As agriculture is very dependent on climatic conditions, these changes cause supply
55 shocks, affecting availability of wheat in producer and importer countries. Uncertainty of
56 crop yields and price volatility will be a common situation to confront in the near future,
57 and escalating demand is not likely to be fully met (D’Odorico *et al.*, 2014). According
58 to d’Amour *et al.*’s (2016) estimations, just a 10% reduction in the exports of the three
59 main crops (rice, wheat and corn) would affect by 5% the calorific intake of 55 million
60 people living in Africa.

61 Currently, only through international trade can the food requirements of the world
62 population be covered. In the last 50 years food exports have grown at an exponential
63 rate, higher than the production growth (Ercsey-Ravasz *et al.*, 2012). During the period
64 2009-2013, USA ranked first among wheat exporters, with an export volume of around

65 31.14 million tonnes, followed by Australia (22.51 million tonnes) and France (20.59
66 million tonnes). The leading wheat importing country was Egypt, with an import volume
67 of 11.73 million tonnes, followed by Algeria (7.75 million tonnes) and Italy (7.44 million
68 tonnes). Regarding wheat production, China ranked first, with a production of 118.13
69 million tonnes, followed by India (87.35 million tonnes) and USA (58.93 million tonnes)
70 (see Table S1 in the supplementary material for further details).

71 According to D’Odorico *et al.* (2014) nearly one quarter of the total food consumed
72 is obtained by importing from other countries. In many cases, it is the lack of the
73 necessary water to produce those foods that makes this trade essential. But as production
74 uncertainty and price volatility are more recurrent facts, food security for many countries
75 becomes an issue. Theoretically, a global market makes the system more resilient as local
76 shocks can be compensated by sourcing from areas further afield; however, if the shocks
77 are of high intensity or occur over a wide region, this global sourcing cause severe
78 vulnerability to the system (Jones and Philips, 2016).

79 Different researchers have studied the international wheat trade and countries’
80 vulnerabilities to supply shocks. The Bonilla Index (BI, ratio of national food import to
81 the value of national total exports) has been proposed as a measure of the food security
82 of a developing country (Larochez-Dupraz and Huchet-Bourdon, 2016). Countries with
83 low BI values would have the financial resources to react to food price hikes. However,
84 when production or other types (e.g. geopolitical or global health) of crises occur, food
85 sourcing becomes complex and dependent on additional aspects (countries affected,
86 international relationships, restrictive trade policies by major exporters to stabilise
87 domestic supply, etc).

88 The main goal of this research is to ascertain how vulnerable the wheat world trade
89 network is to supply shocks of varying extensions and intensities. To this end, we need
90 to use data on wheat production, national stocks and population of various countries as
91 well as the trade flows between them. The optimum method to model these trade flows is
92 as a weighted directed network. Hence it is interesting also to use metrics derived from
93 complex networks analysis (CNA) to better understand the structure of the global wheat
94 trade system and see if this can partly explain the vulnerability results. Thus, for example,
95 as stated by Kummur *et al.* (2020), countries depending on imports from a few trading
96 partners are in a vulnerable position.

97 We understand vulnerability as the exposure of any agent, given its current trading
98 partners, or of the whole system, given its network topology, to the risk that any
99 unplanned event would produce scarcity of the given staple in the short-term, thus not
100 satisfying the needs of the population. We want to test whether the number of people
101 affected by severe wheat shock production has increased in recent years, or if on the
102 contrary, the global situation is improving. By simulating a number of different situations
103 and crisis intensities, we estimate the population affected by those events at country level,
104 and how this vulnerability has been changing in the studied period. By repeating the
105 simulation five years later and comparing the results, we will check how the vulnerability
106 has evolved in this period, providing a general idea of the network resilience. Regarding
107 the COVID-19 outbreak, we also estimate the effects of a possible global supply shock
108 on the international wheat trade, considering varying intensity scenarios.

109 The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a review of some
110 previous papers dealing with wheat trade modelling using the methodology proposed
111 here, CNA. In section 3 the results of our analysis of wheat trade (taking 5-year data) are
112 presented. In section 4 we explain the vulnerability simulations carried out and show our
113 results for the various scenarios. The discussion of those results and their implications are
114 presented in Section 5.

115 **2. CNA MODELLING FOR STUDYING WHEAT TRADE**

116 As mentioned above, a number of papers have also used CNA techniques to study
117 agri-food trade, mainly at a global level. Usually in these types of networks, each node
118 represents a country and the edges indicate the different trade flows between them. The
119 aim is to better understand the characteristics of the global trade and the position of each
120 country. For instance, nodes with many inbound arcs have an advantageous position as
121 they have more sourcing alternatives. Similarly, nodes with many outgoing links have a
122 central role in the network as they export to many countries.

123 This literature review focusses on two threads of paper. On the one hand we
124 consider studies that basically use CNA techniques to analyse the structure of the global
125 wheat trade network, often considered together with other crops (such as maize or rice).
126 The second group of papers deals with the analysis of the vulnerability of countries to
127 supply shocks.

128 Table 1 provides a summary of wheat-centred CNA studies. As mentioned above,
129 some of the studies (e.g. Wang 2010, Fair et al. 2017, Dong et al. 2018) consider just
130 wheat trade, while others consider wheat together with other crops (e.g. Sartori and
131 Schiavo, 2015, d'Amour et al., 2016, Burkholz et al. 2019). The pioneering work of Wang
132 (2010) considers 76 countries and 183 trade wheat relationships in a single year (2009)
133 revealing that bargaining in the wheat trade network inclines towards exporting countries.
134 Puma et al. (2015) assess changes in connectivity within the global wheat and rice trade
135 networks focussing on the average values for two time periods (1992–1996; 2005–2009).
136 Continuing with Puma et al. (2019)'s work, our study focusses on the five-year data
137 following the latest world crisis in 2008, that, particularly in the case of wheat, chiefly
138 affected developing countries that in most instances are net importers.

139 Other studies analysed competitive relationships among wheat importers (Dong
140 et al. 2018) and international food trade in terms of the corresponding amount of calories
141 (Torreggiani et al. 2018). Although not included in Table 1, it is interesting to note also
142 the study of Ercsey-Ravasz et al (2012), which relates the international food trade network
143 (1988-2008) (in currency units of trade fluxes) to food safety through the transfer of
144 contaminants across borders.

145 From another perspective, Dupas et al. (2019) analyse cereals' trade according to
146 their temporal stability, introducing the concept of a backbone food subnetwork during
147 the period from 1986 to 2013, detecting invariant structures that provide flexibility to
148 perturbations and shocks. Selim et al. (2019) use the concept of virtual water to study
149 trade flows of all types of agricultural products. Recently, the dependencies arising from
150 interlinkages among food, energy, water resources and trading partners have also been
151 addressed through a nexus approach (Vora et al. 2019).

152 ===== Table 1 =====

153 Sartori and Schiavo (2015) aimed at characterising the corresponding weighted
154 directed network, analysing its in- and out-degree and in- and out-strength distribution,
155 average clustering coefficient, assortativity, community structure and node centrality
156 measures during the period 1986-2010. A different approach is presented in Fair et al.
157 (2017), in which a calibrated preferential attachment network formation model is used to
158 measure the evolution of the network (in terms of its density, symmetry, average path
159 length, clustering coefficient, assortativity, etc.) in response to shocks of varying severity

160 and duration – shocks that can be random (errors) or selective (targeted attacks).
161 Torreggiani et al. (2018) address the community structure detection considering the
162 international food trade network as a collection of separate layers; the analysis is
163 supplemented by fitting probit and logit regression models to estimate the probability of
164 two countries belonging to the same cluster.

165 Regarding the studies on the vulnerability of countries to different types of shocks
166 originating in a single country or in a group of countries, some studies (e.g. d'Amour et
167 al. 2016) consider only first-round effects, while others simulate the propagation of these
168 shocks through network trade links (e.g. Tamea et al. 2016, Marchand et al. 2016,
169 Burkholz et al. 2019). Thus, although a country's reserves (as well as domestic
170 consumption) can partly absorb some shocks, it frequently happens that the exports of the
171 affected countries are reduced or banned, thus propagating the initial shock. Some studies
172 (e.g. Puma et al. 2015, Gephart et al. 2016) also take into account the demand price
173 elasticity and the fact that richer countries have greater possibilities to pay the resulting
174 world market price increases and secure food supplies without reducing their
175 consumption, as poor countries may be forced to do. In general, it seems that the global
176 food system does show features consistent with a vulnerability condition and a
177 susceptibility to self-propagating disruptions. Generally, vulnerability studies compute
178 self-sufficiency ratios and vulnerability/impact indexes that, in some cases, also take into
179 account the population size affected in different countries.

180 In this paper, we integrate the two threads of research reviewed above as we
181 analyse the structure of the global wheat trade network and assess its vulnerability.
182 Moreover, we study whether the observed vulnerability can be partially explained by the
183 topology of the network as given by different characterisation metrics. Also, among the
184 CNA metrics considered, we have included the PageRank index, which measures a
185 country's centrality from the importer or exporter perspective and that to the best of our
186 knowledge has not been used before in these types of networks.

187 **3. COMPLEX NETWORK ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL WHEAT TRADE FLOWS**

188 This section presents the characterisation, using CNA indexes and metrics, of the
189 global Wheat Trade Network (WTN). This will allow us to understand the structure and
190 the main features of the network. Thus, we are interested in the following: measuring
191 different topological features such as the density of the network (i.e. what percentage of

192 all pairs of countries trade); the extent that trade links are reciprocal (i.e. bidirectional);
193 the transitivity (often called clustering in the CNA parlance) of the trade relationships in
194 the WTN; the distances among the nodes in the network; what the most central countries
195 in the global wheat trade are from an importer or an exporter point of view; whether the
196 WTN is scale-free (i.e. its degree distribution follows a Power Law so that most countries
197 have a small number of trading partners, however, there are a few “hub countries” that
198 have a large number of trading links); whether there is homophily (e.g. of geographical
199 type) so that nodes of the same type trade among themselves more than nodes of different
200 types; whether there exist significant motifs (i.e. local connection patterns that occur with
201 a frequency unlikely to be due to randomness); the community structure (i.e. different
202 groups of countries that trade intensively within-group much more than with countries
203 that belong to other groups), etc. All these questions can be effectively answered using
204 CNA tools and techniques. That is why, as the literature review presented in the previous
205 section shows, CNA has generally been used for this characterisation task.

206 Data on bilateral wheat trade flows between countries for the years 2009-2013
207 were obtained from the Statistics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization
208 (FAOSTAT, <http://faostat.fao.org>) and used to build a weighted, directed WTN. To
209 smooth out fluctuations in the various years these trade flows were averaged. Table 2
210 shows some metrics of this 2009-2013 WTN.

211 For economy of space, we do not provide the formal definition or the
212 mathematical expressions used to compute these measures because they are well-known
213 and can be found in any CNA textbook (e.g. Wasserman and Faust 1994) as well as in
214 many CNA surveys (e.g. Newman 2003, Costa et al. 2007). In any case, the network
215 density refers to the number of existing trade links as a proportion of all possible trade
216 links. This is related to a high average in- and out-degree. The in-degree of a country is
217 the number of countries from which it imports, while its out-degree is the number of
218 countries to which it exports. The average path length and the network diameter are
219 measures of how far, in terms of the number of links required to go from one node to
220 another, the nodes are from each other. The farther a node is from a given node, the less
221 it can be affected by it, at least in a first round.

222 Note that our network has a relatively high density, small average path length and
223 diameter, high out-degree centralisation, and a high degree of reciprocity and clustering.
224 The small distances between countries within the WTN (known in CNA parlance as a

225 Small-World network) indicates the integrated character of the global wheat trade, which
 226 makes countries dependent of one another for their food security. The degree
 227 centralisation is an index that measures whether the similarity of the WTN to a star
 228 network, with a certain node occupying a central position. The high reciprocity index
 229 indicates a high frequency of bidirectional flows, something which may seem surprising
 230 at first sight as it might be expected that a country is either an exporter or an importer, but
 231 not both. The high average clustering coefficient indicates the likelihood that the trade
 232 partners of a given country also trade among themselves (i.e. transitivity).

233 ===== Table 2 =====

234 Figure 1 shows two visualisations of the network using *NetDraw* (within the
 235 *UCINET 6.0* Package, Borgatti *et al.*, 2002). To reduce clutter, the arcs have been filtered
 236 so that only those with a weight above the third quantile (Q3) have been retained. The
 237 network is the same in both cases, except that in Figure 1 (top panel) to emphasise
 238 imports, the size of the nodes is proportional to the in-degree, while in Figure 1 (bottom
 239 panel) exports are emphasised and the node sizes are proportional to their out-degree. To
 240 help differentiate the two visualisations of the network, in one the node shapes are circles
 241 and in the other rounded squares. ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes are used to name the
 242 countries. Countries with a major importer role are Iran, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco,
 243 Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Spain, Germany and Turkey, among others. Exporting
 244 countries with a large number of trading partners include the USA, Canada, Australia,
 245 Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, Argentina, France and Germany, among others. Note that it is
 246 not uncommon for a country to be involved simultaneously in imports and exports.

247 ===== Figure 1 =====

248 Figure 2 shows the plot of in-strength versus out-strength of the nodes. The in-
 249 strength is the sum of the weights of the arcs that enter a node (i.e. the total volume of
 250 imports of the country) while the out-strength is the sum of the weights of all the arcs that
 251 leave a node (i.e. the total exports of the country). The top right quadrant corresponds to
 252 the most active trading partners, having large in- and out-strengths. Note the prominent
 253 positions, close to the top right corner, of the USA, Germany, Brazil, Russia, France.
 254 Argentina, Ukraine and, especially, Australia exports more than they import. In contrast,
 255 countries such as Turkey, Spain and Italy import more than they export. The lower right

256 quadrant corresponds to countries with large imports and small or no exports – countries
 257 such as South Korea, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Morocco, Peru and the Philippines.
 258 Excluding for Angola, the lower left quadrant corresponds mainly to small countries with
 259 small or no exports. Note that the top left quadrant is empty, i.e. we conclude that large
 260 exporters are in most cases also large importers.

261 ===== Figure 2 =====

262 An important feature of many real-world networks is their scale-free nature. To
 263 test whether WTN also has that property, a Power law (PL) fit analysis of the in-, out-
 264 and total degree and the in-, out- and total strength has been performed using the method
 265 in Clauset *et al.* (2009) (see Table S2 in the supplementary material for further details).
 266 In all cases, except out-degree, a PL distribution with a corresponding exponent can be
 267 fitted. This is the signature of scale-free networks and indicates a right-skewed, non-
 268 homogeneous distribution of these variables. Thus, for example, it means that most
 269 countries have fewer connections and a low trade volume and a few countries (that can
 270 be labelled as hubs) have a greater number of connections and a large trade volume. Table
 271 3 shows the 20 top countries in terms of in- and out-degree and in- and out-strength. Note
 272 that only one country (namely, Germany), shown in bold, appears in this top-20 list for
 273 all four measures. Several other countries, however, such as the USA, Canada, France,
 274 Italy, Brazil, the UK and the Netherlands, appear in three of the four rankings. Looking
 275 at the in- and out-degrees, it can also be seen that the importing countries with the largest
 276 number of trading partners (Italy and UK) import from around 50 countries, while the
 277 exporting countries that have the greatest number of trading partners (USA, France,
 278 Germany, Russia and Canada) export to more than 100 countries.

279 ===== Table 3 =====

280 Following the direction of the arcs and the reverse direction, respectively, the
 281 corresponding PageRank (Brin and Page, 1998) of the countries can be computed. This
 282 is a centrality measure that indicates the probability of a node being visited by a random
 283 surfer that follows the arcs that leave (or, in the reverse direction case, that go into) a node
 284 with a probability proportional to their weights. Table 4 shows the countries with the main
 285 importer and exporter PageRank values. Note that most central countries from an import
 286 perspective are located in Africa and the Middle East, plus some countries in Europe

287 (namely, Italy and Spain) and East Asia (namely, Pakistan, Singapore and the
 288 Philippines). The most central exporting countries are located in North and South
 289 America, Europe (including Ukraine) and Central Asia (including Russia), plus Australia
 290 and New Zealand.

291 ===== Table 4 =====

292 Another common feature of many real-world networks is the existence of
 293 homophily, i.e. that the patterns of links between the nodes is correlated with certain node
 294 attributes. To test the hypothesis that there is geographical homophily in the WTN, i.e.
 295 that countries trade more with those countries that are closer than with those that are far
 296 away, we have considered six regions, namely North America (including Central America
 297 and the Caribbean), South America, Europe (including Ukraine), Africa, Asia (including
 298 Russia) and Oceania, so that Table 5 shows the number of arcs and the sum of the
 299 corresponding weights within and between each of these six regions. The E-I index is
 300 0.125 in the case of the number of arcs and slightly higher, 0.295, in the case of the sum
 301 of weights. This indicates that there are more arcs between regions than within regions
 302 and, moreover, more trade flows through the between-regions arcs than through those
 303 within-region. Thus, although the wheat trade between European countries is significant,
 304 most trade more with the rest of the world than within. An extreme case is Africa, whose
 305 trade corresponds to imports from Europe, Asia and North America, in that order. In the
 306 case of Asia, although its exports are mainly within the region, the imports come primarily
 307 from outside the region, in particular from North America and Europe, in that order. The
 308 pairs of regions for which the density of arcs is higher than the overall network density
 309 are: North-America↔North-America, North-America→South-America, South-
 310 America↔South-America, South-America→Africa, South-America→Asia,
 311 Europe↔Europe, Europe→Africa, Europe↔Asia, Asia↔Asia, Oceania→Asia and
 312 Oceania↔Oceania. Note also the trade balance (total exports minus total imports) for the
 313 different regions; it is positive and large for Europe and North America, positive and
 314 moderate for Oceania and South America and negative and large for Africa and Asia.

315 ===== Table 5 =====

316 It is also interesting to find the community structure of WTN. Communities (also
317 called modules) are groups of nodes with more connections within-groups than between-
318 groups. These communities involve spontaneous trading blocks and reflect
319 multidimensional (i.e. geopolitical, historical and economic) aspects. The existence and
320 identification of communities in a network can be found using different algorithms (see
321 Fortunato 2010). The goal is to partition the nodes into various groups so that these groups
322 represent “true” communities.

323 Many of those community detection algorithms measure the significance of a
324 community using a measure known as modularity (Newman 2004). The modularity
325 function measures the fraction of all the arcs that lie within communities minus the
326 expected value in a so-called null model (i.e. a network with the same degree distribution
327 but with arcs generated randomly). A modularity of zero indicates that the community
328 structure is similar to that of a random network and hence not significant. The larger the
329 value of the modularity, the larger the deviation from randomness and the more
330 significant the community structure. Table S3 in the supplementary material shows the
331 results of the leading eigenvector (LE) community detection algorithm (Newman, 2006).
332 The community partition found has a modularity of 0.338 and involves three large
333 communities: one that contains the USA, Canada, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and
334 their corresponding trading partners (including China, India, Japan and South Korea);
335 another group of countries formed by Russia, Ukraine, Iran, Turkey and their main trading
336 partners (including Egypt, Israel and Pakistan); and a third cluster that contains most
337 European countries, Argentina, Uruguay and their main trading partners (including
338 Morocco, Algeria and South Africa).

339 Another aspect worth investigating is the type of local interactions within the
340 WTN. This can be achieved by analysing the relative frequency of each possible
341 interconnection pattern (called motifs in CNA). The goal is to identify those motifs whose
342 relative frequency deviates significantly from that which would be expected in a random
343 network. The idea is that the over- or underrepresentation of those motifs in the real
344 network must be for a reason. Moreover, motifs have been hypothesised to function as
345 building blocks of complex networks (Milo et al., 2002). Table S4 in the supplementary
346 material shows the triad census (i.e. motifs of size three) of the WTN computed by
347 *UCINET 6.0*. It was found that all transitive triads have high counts, which is consistent
348 with the relatively high transitivity reported in Table 2. In particular, there are 1,386

349 cliques of size three (triad code 300). Recall that a clique is a set of nodes, all of which
350 are connected between themselves (bidirectionally) and hence form a tightly connected
351 substructure. The number of such cliques of size three in WTN is significantly higher
352 than in a random network. A more detailed analysis of three and four-node motifs have
353 been performed using the *mfinder* network motifs detection tool. Tables S5 and S6 in the
354 supplementary material show the significant (i.e. relatively frequent compared with a null
355 model corresponding to a similar randomised network) directed motifs found. For each
356 motif, the observed and expected counts, the concentration, z-score and uniqueness and
357 some examples are shown.

358 **4. NETWORK VULNERABILITY**

359 As mentioned above, the frequency of finding shocks in the supply network that
360 affect the international wheat trade has increased. In addition to extreme weather
361 conditions, political decisions are not uncommon as a response to price volatility (e.g.
362 according to Puma *et al.*, 2015, six of the largest wheat exporters imposed trade
363 restrictions in 2008 to protect domestic markets), leading on occasions to a cascade effect.
364 Jones and Phillips (2016) studied the frequency of food production shocks. They define
365 “global shock” as the result of a major producer (or several smaller producers)
366 experiencing a production crisis. In their study they claim that at country level a country
367 suffers a “major shock” (loss of more than 58%) every other year. The shocks considered
368 in the literature are not usually as large as that. Thus, d’Amour *et al.* (2016) considered
369 10% reduction scenarios for their analysis of the effects of food shocks, while Marchand
370 *et al.* (2016) used a 20% production decrease in their simulations.

371 *4.1. Local shocks assessment*

372 To assess how robust the wheat network is, we need to focus on production shocks
373 occurring just in some of the main traders. For the identification of the largest wheat
374 producers we have considered the global production in the period 2009-2013 and after
375 sorting out all the countries, we selected those representing 85% of the cumulative
376 production. This results in 20 countries, namely: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China,
377 Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Romania,
378 Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA and Uzbekistan.

379 We have simulated the effects of each of these countries experiencing a production
 380 crisis, thus affecting the countries with which they trade. Let us denote by P_c the
 381 production of country c in a specific year; $t_{cc'}$, the amount of wheat exported from
 382 country c to c' ; and Δ_c the change in the strategic reserves (positive if stocks are reduced,
 383 following FAO data standard). We could estimate the internal demand of country c given
 384 by

$$ID_c = \sum_{c'} t_{c'c} + P_c + \Delta_c - \sum_{c'} t_{cc'} \quad (1)$$

385 If we want to assess the effect on that country of a reduction of $\alpha_{c'}$, per cent in the
 386 production of a country c' , we could calculate the percentage of internal demand covered
 387 as

$$I_{c,\alpha} = \frac{\sum_{c'} \alpha_{c'} t_{c'c} + \alpha_c P_c + \Delta_c - \alpha_c \sum_{c'} t_{cc'}}{\sum_{c'} t_{c'c} + P_c + \Delta_c - \sum_{c'} t_{cc'}} \quad (2)$$

388 According to d'Amour *et al.* (2016), vulnerability to food supply shocks can be
 389 measured by how the crisis is translated into the domestic market, and by the number of
 390 poor people affected. Note that, following our notation, the population affected by a
 391 supply shock of intensity α is therefore given by

$$PA_{c,\alpha} = (1 - I_{c,\alpha}) \cdot \text{Population}_c \quad (3)$$

392 and the global population affected would be

$$GPA_\alpha = \sum_c PA_{c,\alpha} \quad (4)$$

393 For our simulations, we will consider crises of different intensities (α varying from 5%
 394 to 50%) on each of the 20 major producers, occurring at one or two simultaneously.
 395 Therefore, $20+20 \cdot 19/2=210$ scenarios are considered for the simulation. It must be noted
 396 that these results must be read as the immediate effect of any shock, considering the

397 current trading partners and stock variation. Of course, the governments may react in time
 398 to any supply shock by going to the markets and bidding to compensate for the shortfalls.

399 Looking at the results of the 210 simulations corresponding to the years 2009, 2011 and
 400 2013, Figure 3 shows the boxplot corresponding to the population affected $PA_{c,\alpha}$ by an
 401 $\alpha=50\%$ drop in production in various countries' combinations. Note that the central
 402 values changed in this period (median was 159m in 2009 and 145m in 2013, i.e. a 9%
 403 reduction), and variability has become smaller in more recent years. This may be a sign
 404 that the network is becoming more resilient to this type of crisis; Figure 4 confirms that,
 405 for different crises' intensities, during this period the population affected has decreased
 406 for all production drops.

407 ===== Figures 3 & 4 =====

408 The evolution (in the period under study, 2009-2013) of the percentage of the
 409 population $I_{c,0.5}$ that is covered in each country when a 50% drop (major shock) occurs in
 410 one of the major producers, can help to gauge how resilient each country is becoming to
 411 confront an international wheat crisis. Positive values mean that in the 5-year period the
 412 percentage of population covered after a 50% crisis in one (or two) of the major producers
 413 has improved for that nation, while positions below 0 imply a worse situation. Figure 5
 414 shows the position of each country considering its GDP per capita.

415 ===== Figure 5 =====

416 Displaying again the evolution of the internal demand covered in the same period
 417 under a 50% crisis, but now versus the evolution of the ratio of the internal demand that
 418 is covered by importation (i.e., $\sum_{c'} t_{c'c} / ID_c$), the results can be seen in Figure 6.
 419 Countries in the upper-left quadrant have improved their resilience and at the same time
 420 reduced their dependence on imports. Most of those countries are in Asia. In contrast,
 421 countries in the lower-right quadrant are in a less resilient position than 5 years earlier
 422 and in addition are more dependent on imports. Many countries in Africa, America and
 423 Asia are in this position.

424 ===== Figure 6 =====

425 On some occasions, the supply problem is not directly related to a production
426 crisis but to some political decisions. This is the case when a country decides to ban its
427 exports, for whatever reason. Figure 7 shows the effects when one of the main producers
428 reduces its wheat exports to zero. It can be seen that for most producer countries, the
429 effects of a ban of its exports on the population affected $GPA_{0.5}$ have decreased from 2009
430 to the situation of 2013 (notably for Argentina, Germany or Ukraine). However, other
431 countries have become more influential in this sense, especially in the case of the USA,
432 which is not only the country affecting a greater number of the population, but also this
433 effect has increased over the years.

434 ===== Figure 7 =====

435 We also carried out a Fractional regression analysis (Papke and Wooldrige, 1996) to
436 examine the effects of population, network topology (as given by different CNA
437 measures) and world region (North America versus S. America, Europe, Africa and
438 Oceania) on the internal demand covered index (2) averaged for all possible scenarios
439 considered. Different fractional model specifications for the conditional expectation are
440 estimated using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Ramalho et al, 2010). All the
441 variables, except PageRank-importer and nominal dichotomous variables, were converted
442 into their natural logarithm.

443 Estimated results are shown in Table 6. It can be noticed that all estimates reveal
444 the same conclusions in terms of their sign, however, with respect to significance, all the
445 specifications are coincident, except for Complementary Log-Log (hereafter CLog-Log)
446 that identifies one more explanatory variable, namely the logarithm of the total degree
447 (denoted LDegree).

448 The results of the fractional regression do not confirm that highly populated
449 countries have a positive capacity to handle the type of shock we are considering.
450 However, with negative significant coefficients we find regressors such as the in-strength
451 of the countries. This shows how the dependency on the import of wheat can have a
452 negative effect on the ability of countries to guarantee the appropriate supply of this cereal
453 to fulfil the internal demand when some shocks are expected. Another variable with a
454 negative coefficient is the total degree of the node, which is the sum of its in- and out-

455 degree. It seems that, in the short-term, a shock originating somewhere in the network, is
456 likely to affect countries having many trading partners.

457 Regarding the regions, according to these regression results, countries in Europe,
458 Asia and South America are in a better position to attend their internal demand under a
459 shock event. In this regard, note that many large wheat producers are located in Europe
460 and Asia. The P-test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981) was calculated to discriminate
461 between alternative non-linear fractional model specifications. The P-test results indicate
462 that the Clog-Log model specification is more suitable. This may be due to the fact that
463 Clog-Log describes an asymmetric pattern approach, where the conditional mean of the
464 internal demand covered index increases slowly at small increments of cumulative
465 distribution function (Cdf) and sharply when Cdf is close to unity.

466 ===== Table 6 =====

467 *4.2. Global shock assessment*

468 Once the immediate effects on the wheat trade network of local shocks on the
469 main producer countries have been analysed, it may be of interest to assess the effects
470 provoked by a global supply shock in which all major producers limited their exports.
471 Such global crises (e.g. due to a climate-affecting volcano eruption, a world war, a
472 pandemic), although unlikely, has attracted the attention of some analysts in the field of
473 food security. As an example, Jägermeyr et al (2020) studied the effect on the world wheat
474 production in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Such conflict would generate
475 climate perturbations that would provoke a fall in wheat production worldwide of up to
476 11% over 5 years. This would affect cereal availability even for major producers. For
477 instance, by year 4 Poland would lose a 33% of its current stock, with more severe
478 restrictions in countries relying on imports (up to a 90% reduction in some African
479 countries).

480 We can simulate this type of global shock using the current wheat trade network,
481 assuming reductions of 10%, 20% and 30% in the production and export of all major
482 producers (20 countries). The results show that under the current trade network, such
483 restrictions would affect 574 million people in the less severe scenario, with only 30% of
484 the 204 countries considered able to absorb the disturbances. Figure 8 shows the summary

485 of the demand per country covered in each scenario, considering the current trade
486 network.

487 ===== Figure 8 =====

488 It may be interesting at this point to comment on the current COVID-19 pandemic,
489 to ascertain what would happen if, having already played havoc with the global economy,
490 it was to lead also to a global supply shock in the wheat market. We first observe that
491 given the uncertainty that this unexpected event produces, governments may be tempted
492 to act as common households do, i.e., hoarding food as a strategic resource (Sulser and
493 Dunston, 2020). This response would be aimed at trying to stabilise domestic prices as a
494 result of the transient distribution problems provoked by the exceptional restrictions of
495 movement imposed in many countries. Note, however, that such price increases do not
496 need to happen. For example, in China the impact of COVID-19 on rice and wheat flour
497 prices was insignificant (Yu et al, 2020). Major producers such as Russia, Ukraine,
498 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Romania imposed export limits (in the latter case just for
499 one week after the intervention of the EU). Other countries, however, did not follow this
500 path and during the initial months of the pandemic increased their exports figures (as was
501 the case of France).

502 As pointed out by Torero Cullen (2020), trade restrictions generate scarcity and
503 therefore panic, harming consumers as well as producers. Demand shocks occur at the
504 same time as supply shocks. It is important that in these cases the supply chains do not
505 break down, especially for staple commodities (such as wheat). Fortunately, wheat
506 production is capital-intensive, unlike high-value commodities (such as fruits and
507 vegetables), which are labour-intensive produces. Therefore, labour shortages due to
508 COVID-19 restrictions on the movement of workers are not affecting cereal production,
509 and only limited distribution problems could be expected.

510 In addition, the current global stocks of wheat are better than they were in the
511 previous 2008 crisis and the 2020 wheat crop prospects are good, which does not make
512 any drastic measures necessary. Nevertheless, using the partial-equilibrium International
513 Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) model,
514 developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Sulser and
515 Dunston (2020) have estimated the effects of wheat trade restrictions in five ex-USSR

516 countries. They expect a global 4% price increase and an increase of around 6 million
517 people suffering chronic hunger (rising to 18 million if trade restrictions on rice are also
518 implemented in South-East Asia and India). The paradox is that this could happen even
519 when no scarcity is expected. Other studies have made an estimation of 130 million
520 people who would face acute hunger due to border thickening, logistics shutdown, donor
521 countries' recessions reducing food aid to poor countries, higher operation costs and
522 collapse of household economies (Cardwell and Ghazalian, 2020).

523 **5. DISCUSSION**

524 Wheat is one of the most important crops when discussing human food. For
525 millions of people around the globe it is the basic source in their intake of calories and,
526 for this reason, it is a major issue for most countries to guarantee the required amount of
527 this cereal will reach their internal markets. However, most countries are not able to
528 produce sufficient to fulfil their own demand, and therefore they have to rely on
529 international trade to satisfy their needs, complementing their production and strategic
530 stocks. This makes the world trade of wheat a very complex network, capturing the flow
531 of cereal among all the agents involved.

532 As a first step, a complex network analysis of the network, using data from years
533 2009-2013, has been carried out. It has been found that the WTN shows a high degree of
534 reciprocity and clustering; the degree and strength distributions follow a Power law
535 distribution, and there are a small number of recurrent motifs in the network, in particular
536 transitive ones. It has also been found that the WTN shows regional
537 heterophily/disassortativity, i.e. a tendency of countries to trade with other countries in
538 the same region.

539 Regarding the analysis of the evolution of countries' vulnerability when a major
540 production crisis occurs in any of the largest producers, crises of varying intensities have
541 been simulated considering more than 200 combinations of major producers experiencing
542 production shocks. The number of people initially affected by those local crises (i.e.,
543 before further actions are taken by the corresponding governments to counter their
544 effects) was considered as the dependent variable. Our results show that in general, the
545 most recent trading network (2013) shows a reduction in the number people affected when
546 this type of production shortage occurs. In fact, according to Figure 4, in the case of the
547 smaller crisis considered ($\alpha=10\%$) there is a reduction of 6.3% in the number of affected

548 people between the first and the last year of the 5-year period, while in the case of the
549 50% production drop, the reduction in the people affected in 2013 is 4.7% when compared
550 with 2009.

551 We have observed a relevant factor affecting the change in the vulnerability over
552 the years. As shown in Figure 5, for countries with higher per capita GDP the situation
553 has not changed substantially in the period, while for those with lower per capita GDP
554 there is a greater variability, with countries improving up to 4 points (such as Guinea or
555 Sudan), while others are worsening by around 4 points (Gambia, Kiribati, Bahamas, and
556 surprisingly, Canada). Obviously, countries relying on imports are far more vulnerable to
557 events occurring in the supply regions.

558 Therefore, in general, although some countries clearly have not improved their
559 vulnerability, the WTN as a whole has become more resilient in recent years, making
560 fewer people vulnerable to those critical events. This is in the line with the “*robust-yet-*
561 *fragile*” network paradigm as defined by Puma *et al.* (2015).

562 A fractional regression has been carried out and the results show that countries
563 less dependent on imports can in general more capably attend to their internal demand
564 when a shock occurs somewhere. Also, in terms of geography, from the point of view of
565 their immediate ability to respond to these types of events, countries in Asia and Europe
566 are in general better positioned.

567 In the case of a major disruption of global wheat trade, estimating the effects on
568 wheat stocks and internal demand is a complex task, given the unpredictable political
569 responses of national governments, compounded by the inherent uncertainty of the
570 situation. Depending on the decisions taken, some importing countries could result in
571 serious cereal shortage affecting millions of people. Note that, imposing any trade
572 restrictions can have a cascading effect that in the end harms the market and consequently
573 both consumers and producers, although more the former than the latter, and more the
574 poorer than the wealthy. That is the curse of vulnerability.

575 With regard to the current COVID-19 pandemic, it has disrupted global supply
576 chains in many sectors, including Agri-food sector. There is a consensus, however, that
577 in the short-term its impact on wheat trade might not be big for several reasons. Thus, it
578 is a capital-intensive crop, requiring relatively little labour input. The likelihood of
579 logistics and transport disruptions are also low. Stock reserves are strong and production

580 levels this year are expected to be high. There is the danger, however, that for political
581 reasons, governments may respond to the uncertainty of the overall situation by limiting
582 or banning wheat exports as well as by building up precautionary reserves as a protection
583 against the effects of a protracted global health crisis. Such measures would affect global
584 trade flows and would hurt all parts involved being counterproductive.

585 The main lesson for the market agents is that trade creates interdependencies, and
586 consequently, while it can provide assistance in the case of local shocks originating on
587 your own turf, it exposes countries to shocks and disruptions originating elsewhere and
588 propagated through the trade links. Another significant lesson is that although costly, the
589 role of reserves as buffers that can dampen the effects of supply shocks is important.
590 Without such buffers, it is almost inevitable that just by the pure action of demand and
591 supply forces, some countries (particularly, poorer countries) can be negatively affected
592 by supply shocks in any major producer country. In the end, the overall effects of most
593 supply shocks can be mitigated as the global through trade does not prevent the weakest
594 nodes of the system from being severely hit.

595 It cannot be said that these results are unexpected but it is important nevertheless
596 to be able to show and quantify them. Moreover, the analysis carried out also suggested
597 preventive policy measures. Thus, one way to remedy the unequal distribution of the
598 shortages induced by supply shocks would be by establishing common transnational
599 reserves (at the regional level for example) that can be built up in boom years, thus helping
600 stabilise the market in both directions.

601 As a caveat, it must be noted that how each country reacts at any particular time
602 to supply shocks depends on many factors and political decisions; for this reason, these
603 metrics at country level are just an approximation to this complex problem, which can
604 provide some trends in the global evolution of the system resilience for its better
605 understanding.

606 As limitations of this study, apart from the limited time span of the available data,
607 it can be mentioned that the analysis carried out is based exclusively on physical flows
608 and mass conservation equations. It does not take into account average commodity prices,
609 neither the per capita GDP, nor the income elasticity of demand of the countries.
610 Including such economic information that may enrich the analysis but would require other
611 tools (e.g. regression analysis). Also, the study assumes the current decentralised working
612 of the system and therefore does not explore certain global coordination possibilities that,

613 for example on the occasion of the COVID-19 pandemic, might be put into place, for
614 example, a Global Distributed Reserve Fund. The idea is that an interconnected and
615 integrated system like WTN with decentralised functioning requires some stabilisation
616 mechanism to mitigate and absorb both demand and supply shocks. We believe that this
617 is an interesting topic for further research.

618

619 CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

620

621 **Manuscript Title:** ANALYSIS AND VULNERABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
622 WHEAT TRADE NETWORK

623

624 The authors whose names are listed immediately below certify that they have NO
625 affiliations with or involvement in any organisation or entity with any financial interest
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629 or professional relationships, affiliations, knowledge or beliefs) in the subject matter or
630 materials discussed in this manuscript.

631

632 **Author names:** Ester Gutiérrez-Moya, Belarmino Adenso-Díaz, Sebastián Lozano.

633

634 The first author, signing on behalf of all coauthors of this article.

635

636


August, 10th 2020

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- 735

736 **List of figures and table captions**

- 737 Table 1. Summary of complex network and vulnerability analyses of wheat trade
- 738 Table 2. Some characterisation measures of the WTN (2009-2013)
- 739 Table 3. Countries with highest in- and out-degree and in- and out-strength
- 740 Table 4. Countries with highest PageRank centralities
- 741 Table 5. Cross-regional distribution of wheat trade flows (2009-2013)
- 742 Table 6. Estimation results for the fractional regression models
- 743
- 744
- 745 Figure 1. Filtered WTN (2009-2013) (only arcs with weights above Q3 are shown)
- 746 Figure 2. In-strength versus out-strength (axes are in \log_{10} scale)
- 747 Figure 3. Boxplot of population affected by production drops of 50% in one (or two)
- 748 major producers
- 749 Figure 4. Evolution of the population affected by different intensity levels of production
- 750 crisis
- 751 Figure 5. Difference (2013-2009) between the percentages of internal demand covered
- 752 after 50% drops in production vs. GDP per capita
- 753 Figure 6. Difference (2013-2009) between the percentages of internal demand covered
- 754 after 50% drops in production vs. difference in imports dependence ratios (2013-2009)
- 755 Figure 7. Evolution of the population affected by an export ban in one of the 20 largest
- 756 wheat producers
- 757 Figure 8. Internal demand covered by current wheat trade network under a global shock
- 758 of different intensities

Table 1. Summary of complex network and vulnerability analyses of wheat trade

Crop	Country (Year)	Remarks	Reference
Wheat	76 countries (2009)	Binary and weighted directed network; Network measures (degree centrality, Bonacich power, Betweenness centrality and flow centrality)	Wang (2010)
Wheat and rice	191 - 233 countries for wheat 173 - 218 for rice (1992-2009)	Wheat Trade Network; Rice Trade Network; Weighted directed networks; Network measures (in-out degree, in-out strength); Self-sufficiency ratio; Food supply shocks (two end-member scenarios: static and dynamic accounting)	Puma et al. (2015)
309 crops and animal products	253 countries (1986-2008)	GVWTN Weighted directed network; Density, degree, strength, assortativity, clustering, centralization	Sartori and Schiavo (2015)
Wheat, Maize and Rice	(2007–2011)	Vulnerability analysis, First-round effects, international grain market shocks translated to domestic grain markets, number of poor people affected.	d'Amour et al. (2016)
Seafood products for human consumption	205 reporting territories grouped into 18 regions (2011)	Global trade network of Fish and other aquatic foods; Forward-propagation model, Vulnerability analysis	Gephart et al. (2016)
Barley, corn, rye, millet, mixed grain, oats, rice, sorghum, wheat	1994-1998, 2001-2005, 2007-2011 (162, 164 and 165 countries, respect.)	Weighted directed networks; Dynamic simulation of the short-term response to a food supply shock originating in a single country, Propagation analysis	Marchand et al. (2016)
Agricultural commodities	(1986-2011)	GVWTN Weighted directed network; Propagation model, Impact and vulnerability measure	Tamea et al. (2016)
Wheat	(1986-2011)	Network formation model of global (unweighted) wheat trade network; Short- and medium-term changes in network measures (average path length, assortativity, clustering coefficient) in response to random and selective shocks of different severity and length	Fair et al. (2017)
Wheat	194 countries-areas (2004-2014)	Wheat-trading weighted competition network ; Network measures (degree, density, clustering coefficient, average path length, core–periphery model, competitive direct/indirect intensity)	Dong et al. (2018)
16 most internationally traded staple food commodities	178 countries (1986-2013)	International food trade multi-network (weighted directed); Network measures (density, bilateral density, weighted asymmetry, size of largest connected component, centralisation, binary/weighted assortativity, binary/weighted average clustering, link weights); Community structure Econometric models	Torreggiani et al. (2018)
Maize, Rice, Soy and Wheat	176 countries (1992-2013)	Weighted directed networks; High-order-trade dependency networks Alternative shocks responses (equal shock/proportional shock) are integrated in a cascade model	Burkholz et al. (2019)
10 imported cereals	221 countries (1986-2013)	Weighted bi-directed networks; Network resilience analysis upon three subnetworks (backbone, intermediate, transient) Network measures (degree distribution, assortativity, coefficient, neighbour connectivity, clustering coefficients, shortest path)	Dupas et al. (2019)
Bananas, Rice, Beans-dry, Maize, Potatoes, Wheat	Nile basin countries (2000-2013)	GVWTN Weighted directed network; Network measures (degree, eigenvector centrality, average clustering coefficient, average path length)	Selim et al. (2019)
Cereal grains, animal feed and products of animal origin	50 states plus district of Columbia (2012)	Domestic food transfer network (weighted directed); Network measures (pointwise mutual information, degree, strength, degree centrality)	Vora et al. (2019)

Table 2. Some characterisation measures of the WTN (2009-2013)

	WTN (2009-2013)
# nodes	205
# ties	2,880
Density	0.069
Average geodesic distance	2.6
Diameter	6
Average degree	28.09
In/Out-degree centralisation	0.192/0.601
Average strength	1,987,868
#mutual/#asymm/#null dyads	494/1,892/18,524
Arc/Dyad reciprocity	0.341/0.206
Transitivity	0.233

Table 3. Countries with highest in- and out-degree and in- and out-strength

Rank	In-degree		Out-degree		In-strength		Out-strength	
1	<i>Italy</i>	53	<i>USA</i>	136	Egypt	11,728,660	<i>USA</i>	31,140,952
2	<i>United Kingdom</i>	49	<i>France</i>	106	Algeria	7,747,467	Australia	22,507,513
3	<i>France</i>	47	Germany	106	<i>Italy</i>	7,436,861	<i>France</i>	20,589,849
4	<i>USA</i>	46	Russia	105	<i>Brazil</i>	6,747,760	<i>Canada</i>	20,230,009
5	<i>Netherlands</i>	46	<i>Canada</i>	103	Indonesia	6,268,367	Russia	19,333,453
6	Germany	45	Ukraine	95	Rep of Korea	6,030,813	Ukraine	10,930,267
7	Switzerland	41	Australia	82	Japan	5,983,671	Argentina	10,076,484
8	Spain	41	<i>Italy</i>	74	Iran	5,847,923	Germany	9,728,126
9	Turkey	40	Turkey	70	Spain	5,818,902	Kazakhstan	6,404,751
10	Malaysia	36	Argentina	66	Netherlands	5,105,902	India	4,997,165
11	Morocco	36	India	65	Bangladesh	5,024,025	Romania	4,284,795
12	Israel	36	Romania	63	Yemen	4,859,765	<i>Brazil</i>	3,851,297
13	Belgium	36	<i>United Kingdom</i>	63	Morocco	4,846,121	Bulgaria	3,746,072
14	<i>Canada</i>	34	<i>Brazil</i>	63	Turkey	4,523,317	<i>United Kingdom</i>	2,583,906
15	Uganda	33	Poland	57	Germany	4,434,120	Lithuania	2,430,304
16	Denmark	33	Kazakhstan	57	Nigeria	4,275,886	Uruguay	2,187,734
17	South Africa	32	Bulgaria	56	Philippines	4,163,002	Hungary	2,063,020
18	Saudi Arabia	32	<i>Netherlands</i>	52	Mexico	4,004,984	Poland	1,927,757
19	Algeria	32	Belgium	50	Belgium	3,983,870	Czech Republic	1,816,611
20	Yemen	31	Lithuania	48	South Africa	3,845,008	<i>Netherlands</i>	1,726,364

Note: Countries in all four rankings are shown in bold; Countries in three of the four rankings are shown in italics

Table 4. Countries with highest PageRank centralities

Imports viewpoint	PageRank	Exports viewpoint	PageRank
Yemen	14.32	Russia	26.43
Mali	9.53	Kazakhstan	26.14
Senegal	9.40	USA	23.22
Saudi Arabia	9.15	Canada	22.17
Italy	5.09	Australia	8.01
Rwanda	4.87	Germany	5.15
Uganda	4.79	France	4.92
Singapore	4.37	New Zealand	4.63
U. Arab Emirates	4.36	Hungary	4.04
Kenya	4.14	Paraguay	3.36
Qatar	3.85	Ukraine	3.31
Iran	3.69	Czech Republic	3.30
Israel	3.41	Uruguay	3.17
Jordan	3.26	Romania	3.15
Philippines	2.91	Slovakia	2.77
Spain	2.58	Argentina	2.74
South Africa	2.50	Denmark	2.15
Pakistan	2.33	United Kingdom	2.14
Egypt	2.28	Bulgaria	2.07
Syrian Arab Rep	2.21	Lithuania	2.06

Table 5. Cross-regional distribution of wheat trade flows (2009-2013)

	N. Amer.	S. Amer.	Europe	Africa	Asia	Oceania	Total exports	Total exports–Total imports
N. Amer.	9,102,640 (55 ties) <i>dens:0.063</i>	6,878,940 (33 ties) <i>dens:0.073</i>	3,229,392 (48 ties) <i>dens:0.039</i>	10,642,190 (75 ties) <i>dens:0.045</i>	22,168,238 (81 ties) <i>dens:0.054</i>	398,643 (5 ties) <i>dens:0.012</i>	52,420,043	35,000,228
S. Amer.	152,336 (16 ties) <i>dens:0.035</i>	6,874,237 (41 ties) <i>dens:0.195</i>	383,247 (33 ties) <i>dens:0.053</i>	6,994,407 (87 ties) <i>dens:0.105</i>	3,204,247 (56 ties) <i>dens:0.075</i>	187,700 (2 ties) <i>dens:0.010</i>	17,796,174	10,570,834
Europe	843,006 (41 ties) <i>dens:0.033</i>	108,433 (23 ties) <i>dens:0.014</i>	33,556,136 (725 ties) <i>dens:0.442</i>	22,488,764 (279 ties) <i>dens:0.124</i>	16,449,342 (300 ties) <i>dens:0.146</i>	455,321 (14 ties) <i>dens:0.026</i>	73,901,002	34,350,843
Africa	248 (9 ties) <i>dens:0.005</i>	10,005 (1 tie) <i>dens:0.001</i>	91,610 (28 ties) <i>dens:0.012</i>	615,571 (104 ties) <i>dens:0.035</i>	211,046 (41 ties) <i>dens:0.014</i>	1 (1 tie) <i>dens:0.001</i>	928,481	-55,135,838
Asia	442,056 (39 ties) <i>dens:0.026</i>	227,790 (11 ties) <i>dens:0.015</i>	1,904,349 (128 ties) <i>dens:0.062</i>	11,553,968 (156 ties) <i>dens:0.056</i>	20,181,328 (316 ties) <i>dens:0.128</i>	1,877,232 (20 ties) <i>dens:0.031</i>	36,186,723	-42,939,956
Oceania	589 (5 ties) <i>dens:0.013</i>	4,875 (1 tie) <i>dens:0.005</i>	385,425 (14 ties) <i>dens:0.026</i>	3,769,419 (27 ties) <i>dens:0.037</i>	16,912,478 (42 ties) <i>dens:0.064</i>	1,448,929 (15 ties) <i>dens:0.096</i>	22,521,715	18,153,889
Total imports	10,540,875	14,104,280	39,550,159	56,064,319	79,126,679	4,367,826	203,754,138	–

Note: Bold italics indicates density higher than overall network density

Table 6. Estimation results for the fractional regression models

	Logit	Probit	Log-Log	CLog-Log
LPopulation	0.112 (0.107)	0.041 (0.041)	0.111 (0.106)	0.023 (0.024)
LDegree	-0.148 (0.096)	-0.061 (0.037)	-0.146 (0.095)	-0.038* (0.023)
LInStrength	-0.213*** (0.062)	-0.082*** (0.023)	-0.211*** (0.062)	-0.049*** (0.012)
PageRank- importer	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.004)
SAmerica	0.351 (0.220)	0.145* (0.087)	0.346 (0.218)	0.091* (0.053)
Europe	0.892*** (0.294)	0.364*** (0.113)	0.881*** (0.292)	0.226*** (0.067)
Africa	0.278 (0.263)	0.115 (0.105)	0.275 (0.261)	0.073 (0.064)
Asia	0.584*** (0.162)	0.242*** (0.065)	0.577*** (0.160)	0.152*** (0.039)
Oceania	0.271 (0.364)	0.087 (0.142)	0.272 (0.360)	0.043 (0.085)
Constant	5.029*** (0.946)	2.537*** (0.365)	5.024*** (0.939)	1.671*** (0.216)
Pseudo R ²	0.131	0.132	0.131	0.133
P-test H ₁ : Logit	-	3.211*	4.323**	2.441
P-test H ₁ : Probit	5.588**	-	5.695**	2.215
P-test H ₁ : Loglog	4.142**	3.150*	-	2.395
P-test H ₁ : Cloglog	6.719***	5.125**	6.480***	-

Notes: Dependent variable is the average of the internal demand covered $I_{c,\alpha}$ for all possible scenarios. Values in parenthesis are *robust standard errors*. *, ** and *** indicate statistically *significant* coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively




Figure 1. Filtered WTN (2009-2013) (only arcs with weights above 3rd quartile are shown).

Notes: Top panel: Node size proportional to in-degree (imports); node shapes circles

Bottom panel: Node size proportional to out-degree (exports); node shapes squares




Figure 2. In-strength versus out-strength (axes are in \log_{10} scale)




Figure 3. Boxplot of population affected by production drops of 50% in one (or two) major producers




Figure 4. Evolution of the population affected by different intensity levels of production crisis




Figure 5. Difference (2013-2009) between the percentages of internal demand covered after 50% drops in production vs. GDP per capita




Figure 6. Difference (2013-2009) between the percentages of internal demand covered after 50% drops in production vs. difference in imports dependence ratios (2013-2009)




Figure 7. Evolution of the population affected by an export ban in one of the 20 largest wheat producers




Figure 8. Internal demand covered by current wheat trade network under a global shock of different intensities