

Class or individual *habitus*? Willingness to spend more on reconciliation policies in Europe

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Purpose: Public willingness to pay for extra public benefits and services may demonstrate a tension between the common good (more services) and economic motives (higher taxes for all). In this article, we present an analysis of this trade-off by drawing upon the Bourdieusian theory of social reproduction and *habitus*.

Design/methodology/approach: Employing the European Social Survey (2016), we first examine the patterns of relationships between the agents' position in the social structure and their attitudes across care regimes in Europe. We then analyse whether this link is mediated by agents' individual trajectories and dispositions, such as their beliefs towards equality or tradition, political orientation, or religiosity.

Findings: The findings support the importance of both sociation and individuation in *habitus* formation, albeit to varying degrees across the regimes. Individual attitudes are therefore shaped not only by interests of reproducing or maximising social positions but also by more reflexive propensities to think about the common good.

Originality: In this article, we draw upon the theory of social reproduction and *habitus* by Pierre Bourdieu, who has been thus far rarely employed in the study of welfare attitudes. The article also contributes to the literature that studies the trade-off between the expansion and financing of reconciliation policies.

Keywords: welfare attitudes, work-family reconciliation policies, social reproduction, *habitus*, Pierre Bourdieu, European Social Survey

INTRODUCTION

Work-family reconciliation policies may reduce work-family conflict, boost fertility rates, and support female participation in the labour market, which in turn can help to attain greater gender equality (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Misra *et al.*, 2011). The welfare states in Europe, nonetheless, differ in the extent and design of their policies orientated to work-family reconciliation and support for working parents (Ciccia and Verloo, 2012; Lohmann and Zagel, 2016; Thévenon and Luci, 2012). Public attitudes towards such policies, thereupon, can demonstrate the legitimacy of the existing provision, help policy-makers to better understand public preferences (Guo and Gilbert, 2014; Neimanns and Busemeyer, 2021), as well as signal unmet care needs and policy change opportunities (van Oorschot, 2007). Variations in welfare support between groups could also demonstrate the level of intergenerational, gender or class solidarity in a given society (Taylor-Gooby, 2011; van Oorschot, 2000).

Notwithstanding their relevance, public attitudes towards reconciliation policies remain understudied (Chung and Meuleman, 2017). Further, the existing research that approaches such attitudes usually focuses on support for the public provision or government responsibility for childcare, which tends to be high (Chung and Meuleman, 2017; Guo and Gilbert, 2014). Rarely does it study the questions of financing or public willingness to spend more on services to reconcile work and family roles (for an exception, see Doblytė and Tejero, 2021 or Neimanns and Busemeyer, 2021). Public support, nonetheless, might be more contested in this latter case (Neimanns and Busemeyer, 2021).

On the one hand, families may be viewed as a positively constructed target population (Schneider and Ingram, 1993) or to be deserving of social welfare (van Oorschot, 2000), particularly so once the pressures and ambitions to increase fertility rates in the wake of an

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3 ageing Europe are considered. In other words, families are “socially meaningful” (Schneider
4 and Ingram, 1993: 335) due to their potential contribution to the future of society. In light of
5 this, support for public reconciliation policies should be high. On the other hand, it has been
6 demonstrated that welfare support declines if the public is reminded that improved services
7 entail additional financing by way of, for example, higher taxes (Busemeyer and Garritzmann,
8 2017). Such conditionality might influence the patterns of solidarity, which may depend on
9 national contexts (Neimanns and Busemeyer, 2021).

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20 In this article, we in turn examine whether and how the individual-level drivers –that is, the
21 markers of objectified social position and embodied normative dispositions– shape public
22 *willingness to pay* for extending work-family reconciliation policies in 21 European countries,
23 which are clustered into care regimes based on the distribution of care responsibilities between
24 different institutions within the childcare field. We intend to understand better whether there
25 are cross-regime variations in the patterns of effects and how they may coincide with
26 differences in care arrangements, that is, in how different institutions provide time, financial,
27 or human resources to reconcile work and family lives.

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39 The article contributes to the literature that studies the trade-off between the expansion and
40 financing of reconciliation policies. It also adds to a better understanding of mechanisms that
41 may explain the variation of welfare support for such policies, and that might be “distinct from
42 old risks –such as employment and old age” (Chung and Meuleman, 2017: 65). By studying
43 the trade-off between the common good and economic self-interests, we intend to explore in
44 which situations and contexts “these different sides of human behaviour become salient”
45 (Kangas, 1997: 478). And we do so by drawing upon the theory of social reproduction and
46 *habitus* by Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 2000), who has been thus far rarely employed in the study
47 of welfare attitudes.
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THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

Building upon relational sociology, welfare attitudes can be considered the manifest social relation between personal actors and institutions, which “is nothing other than the *habitus* in action” (Papilloud, 2018: 124). In other words, dispositions embodied via social relations into *habitus* function “as organising principles of welfare attitudes that crystallise competing definitions of social order” (Staerklé *et al.*, 2012: 85). Such organising principles are contingent upon the social system, culture, and agents’ individual trajectories. That is, attitudes may be understood as the result of the interplay between agents’ social/class and individual *habitus*, which are embedded in the field defined by a particular structure of positions or distribution of capital (Bourdieu, 1990, 1997, 2000). The Bourdieusian *habitus*, in turn, “helps us revoke the common-sense duality between the individual and the social” (Wacquant, 2016: 65).

The social or class *habitus* may be viewed as propensities to act and think in a determinate way that are durable, functioning relatively unconsciously, and structured by the social conditions where they have been acquired and are enacted. In other words, individuals who experience “a class of identical or similar conditions of existence” (Bourdieu, 1990: 59) –that is, who accumulate a similar volume and structure of economic (money, material acquisitions), cultural (embodied knowledge, academic qualifications), social (social connections and their capital), and symbolic (prestige or social importance) capital (Bourdieu, 1997)– will internalise similar dispositions, because they are “more likely than any member of another class to have been confronted with the situations most frequent for members of that class” (Bourdieu, 1990: 60).

Such social *habitus* of the dominant groups (i.e., those with accumulated capital) is attuned to the field and its logic (the institutionalisation of distinction), which leads to the naturalisation,

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3 and in turn, reproduction or maximisation of such distinction and *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1990).

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5 That is, the *habitus* of the dominant groups produces practices and perceptions that aim at
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7 maintaining or improving agents' social positions (i.e., maintaining or increasing their capital),
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9 and "[t]his is one of the major principles [...] of everyday choices" (Bourdieu, 2000: 150),
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11 which "result[s] in the unintended consequence of a reproduction of pre-existing class
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13 relations" (Potter, 2000: 238). Given that their *habitus* tends to be adjusted to the operational
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15 logic of the field, which enables them to accumulate capital, such agents will be interested in
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17 conserving rather than transforming the said logic unless the transformation improves their
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19 social position. Capital –in its various forms– "guarantees some people the monopoly of some
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21 possibles" (Bourdieu, 2000: 225), and agents intend to conserve it.
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28 As a result, we hypothesise that the dominant groups –individuals with accumulated economic,
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30 cultural, social, or symbolic capital– will be less willing to pay for extending work-family
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32 reconciliation policies in order to preserve or protect their social positions (hypothesis 1A).
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34 On the other hand, they may be more supportive of such policy transformations if they
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36 perceive extra benefits and services for working parents as an opportunity to
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38 improve/maximise their social positions either directly (e.g., better services that enable them
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40 to cumulate capital) or indirectly (e.g., reputation due to preparedness to invest their economic
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42 capital for the common good) (hypothesis 1B). Put differently, an agent's support for change
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44 –that is, their "practical relation to the future"– is contingent not only upon their *habitus* but
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46 also upon "a certain state of the chances objectively offered to him by the social world"
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48 (Bourdieu, 1990: 64).
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54 Thus, we expect that whether they are more or less supportive will be conditioned by the
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56 current logic of the childcare field or care regime, which is a configuration of personal and
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58 non-personal agents (Papilloud, 2018): the family, the state/public institutions, and the
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3 workplace, which provide/enable formal or informal care. This defines the taken-for-granted
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5 and “the principle of vision and division” in the field (Bourdieu, 2000: 99), such as how
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7 childcare is distributed and what is the role of different institutions in it. Although the welfare
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9 state is a crucial institution in helping individuals to reconcile work and family lives by means
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11 of policies that regulate individuals’ practices (Bourdieu, 1994), other institutions may also
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13 play a role, forming a mix of care arrangements that is likely to vary across European countries
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15 due to a diversity of historical and cultural contexts. Such a mix delimits a range of possible
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17 strategies available to agents in the field “so that everything is not equally possible or
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19 impossible” (Bourdieu, 1997: 46), which favours the reproduction of the field and of the social
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21 hierarchy.
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27 The *habitus*, however, is also shaped by agents’ *singular* trajectories across space and time,
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29 as well as being creative and generative (Bourdieu, 1990, 2000). It may, in turn, result not
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31 only in a semi-unconscious structuring of practices “in order to preserve interests of the
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33 dominant classes in each field” (Papilloud, 2018: 233) but also in a reflexive ‘calculation’ or
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35 normative consideration (Potter, 2000), albeit within the limits of social structures. That is,
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37 there is a relationship between class or group *habitus* and individual *habitus*, a relationship
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39 “of diversity within homogeneity” (Bourdieu, 1990: 60).
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44 We, therefore, hypothesise that the agents’ individual *habitus*, which is structured by their
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46 social position, yet being reflexive and generative, will partially mediate the effects of social
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48 position on support for extending reconciliation policies (hypothesis 2). That is, higher
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50 willingness to spend more on reconciliation policies by the dominant groups may be a
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52 normative rather than interest-based position, or put differently, individuals may embody a set
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54 of normative dispositions that is socially rather than individually conditioned. Yet, if the
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56 relationship between the social position and welfare support remains after controlling for
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3 normative dispositions, individual trajectories should have a unique effect that is not
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5 necessarily socially determined.
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9 Here, we expect that the agents who are more religious (i.e., more culturally conservative,
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11 which affects their views of self and others), who embrace traditional values, or whose
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13 political ideology is right-wing will be more in favour of maintaining the stability of structures,
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15 and therefore, less supportive for extending said policies. As above, the current structure of
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17 the childcare field will also play its role, where the state –through “the framing it imposes
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19 upon practices”– “inculcates common forms and categories of perception and appreciation”
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21 (Bourdieu, 1994: 13), including the norms of ‘proper’ motherhood or childhood. We thus
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23 expect that the link between values, political ideology, or religiosity and welfare attitudes will
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25 be clearer/stronger in care regimes that may be characterised by the dominance of traditional
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27 gender roles in care provision.
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32 In sum, welfare attitudes may be shaped by both social/class and individual *habitus*. These
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34 effects are likely to differ between institutional and cultural contexts in which individuals live
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36 and are socialised. In the following sections, we briefly describe care regimes, outline data
37
38 and methods used in this study, and then present the analysis of welfare attitudes in Europe.
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42 **CARE REGIMES**

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45 Our focus is on the outcome-based regimes rather than policy typologies, for we aim at
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47 understanding the logic of the childcare field, or put differently, the general situation in terms
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49 of care distribution between different institutions (Saxonberg, 2013). Thus, we look into
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51 outcomes or welfare contributions made by the workplace, the family, and the public sector
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53 (with the exception of leave policies due to data availability). We cluster 21 European
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55 countries covered by the following multivariate analysis into care regimes by employing a
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57 hierarchical cluster analysis with standardised variables. After determining the adequate
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3 number of clusters, we repeat the analysis by using a k-means clustering method to assess the
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5 cluster robustness and to determine the importance of different variables in the clustering
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7 process (F-statistic, Table AI in Appendix). The latter confirms the importance of all three
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9 institutions in care arrangements.
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13 Drawing on the relevant literature (Ciccio and Verloo, 2012; Lauri *et al.*, 2020; Lohmann and
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15 Zagel, 2016; Neimanns and Busemeyer, 2021; Saxonberg, 2013), we include the total and
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17 well-paid (income replacement rates at 66% or more) length of statutory leaves available to
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19 mothers, and the total and well-paid period reserved to fathers (International Network on
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21 Leave Policies and Research, 2016); the proportion of children aged 0 to 2 in part-time and
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23 full-time formal childcare (source: EU-SILC); and the net full-time centre-based childcare
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25 costs as the proportion of net household income for families with two children, assuming that
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27 both parents are in employment at average wage (source: OECD Tax-Benefit Database).
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31 Further, while there is a range of services and benefits that employers can provide as part of
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33 occupational welfare, flexible work arrangements are one of the most widespread (Chung,
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35 2019; Thévenon and Luci, 2012; Wiß and Greve, 2020). Unlike other services such as the
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37 crèche, they do not depend on a company's size and may be easier to implement. We thus use
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39 the proportion of employees with access to flexible time arrangements and/or to teleworking
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41 (source: European Working Conditions Survey 2015¹). Finally, we include several variables
42
43 to assess the role of the family as a care provider: the percentage of children aged 0 to 2 using
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45 informal childcare arrangements during a typical week (source: EU-SILC); and full-time and
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47 part-time maternal employment (source: Eurostat). All of the variables are for 2016 or closest.
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56 ¹ Iceland did not participate in the survey. Its data, therefore, was imputed employing the length of well-paid
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58 leave (a polynomial variable), the length of well-paid father's non-transferable leave, the proportion of children
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60 aged 0 to 2 using formal childcare and public expenditure on family benefits as predictors, for there are
indications of crowding-in relations between public and occupational work-family reconciliation policies
(Chung, 2019; Wiß and Greve, 2020).

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3 The analysis suggests a five-cluster solution (Figure A1 in Appendix): (1) Austria, Belgium,
4 Ireland, and Italy; (2) Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia;
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6 (3) Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; (4) France, Germany, and Spain; (5) the
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8 Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. While the identified care regimes bear
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10 similarities to the previous typologies of family policies (e.g., Bambra, 2007; Boje and Ejrnæs,
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12 2012; Leitner, 2003; Saxonberg, 2013), the consideration of three care providers
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14 simultaneously leads to a slightly different classification. Like, for example, Ciccio and Verloo
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16 (2012), we do not find a united Southern European care regime. We also consider countries in
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18 Central and Eastern Europe that have been frequently excluded from the existing typologies.
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25 [Figure 1 around here]

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27 Due to space limitation, we focus on the most general traits of the identified care regimes
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29 (Figure 1). The first cluster resembles the male breadwinner model (Ciccio and Verloo, 2012;
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31 Lauri *et al.*, 2020) due to its relatively short well-paid leaves available to mother, meagre
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33 incentives for fathers to use leave, quite a low proportion of children in formal childcare, and
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35 in turn, fewer mothers in employment than in other regimes. Like the first regime, the second
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37 one features the low proportion of children in formal childcare, low incentives for fathers, and
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39 limited flexible working. Yet, it differs from the first because of its long well-paid leaves
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41 available to mothers (more than a year), which supports childcare at home by the mother, and
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43 thus, signals the model of caregiver parity.
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49 The third care regime is characterised by its commitment to degenderising family policies
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51 (Saxonberg, 2013) and widespread flexible working. Such policies enable mothers to
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53 participate in the labour market. The regime seems to be the closest to the universal caregiver
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55 model in Europe, which is supported by both the state and the employer. In the meantime, the
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57 fourth cluster resembles the male breadwinner model that features the traditional division of
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gender roles. Yet, the difference from the first regime lies in its extended total leave available to mothers (Table AI) and lower involvement of informal social networks in childcare. Finally, the fifth cluster features the lowest length of well-paid leaves and costly formal childcare. While such policies are implicitly genderising, the proportion of mothers in employment is high. The vast majority of them, nevertheless, work part-time, which may suggest unmet childcare needs that are not covered by statutory postpartum leaves or by affordable childcare options. The large proportion of children using informal childcare confirms such needs. All of this suggests the unsupported one-and-a-half breadwinner model.

DATA AND METHODS

For the multivariate analysis of willingness to pay for reconciliation policies, we use the European Social Survey (ESS), Round 8 (2016), which includes the module on welfare attitudes. The sample of 21 countries totals to 39,400. Once the differences between the clusters are verified using pooled data, we group the data by the care regimes and estimate logistic regression models: first, we include the social/class *habitus* and control variables (hypotheses 1A and 1B); second, we also add the variables of individual *habitus* (hypothesis 2).

Dependent variable

The question E25 captures willingness to pay for better services to reconcile work and family lives and is worded as follows: “*would you be against or in favour of the government introducing extra social benefits and services to make it easier for working parents to combine work and family life even if it means much higher taxes for all?*”. The responses include four options that we dichotomise into “in favour” (willingness to pay for better services) and “against”. As Kangas (1997: 492) concludes, “responses to general-level questions speak clearly in favour of social solidarity, whereas more specified questions bring out the more

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3 selfish side of people”. It could be argued, therefore, that the question E25 –as being framed
4 in the constrained or trade-off fashion– measures support for work-family reconciliation
5 policies more reliably so than more general questions about welfare attitudes (Busemeyer and
6 Garritzmann, 2017; Doblytė and Tejero, 2021; Neimanns and Busemeyer, 2021).
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12 13 **The social/class *habitus***

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16 An agent’s position in the social field –that is, their class *habitus*– is defined by the volume
17 and structure of their accumulated capital (Bourdieu 1990, 1997). For economic capital, we
18 employ a variable of subjective economic well-being or feeling about a household’s income
19 nowadays. Years in education measures embodied cultural capital. We choose a time-based
20 variable rather than educational credentials to follow Bourdieu, who states that “the best
21 measure of cultural capital is undoubtedly the amount of time devoted to acquiring it”
22 (Bourdieu, 1997: 54).
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33 Social capital is operationalised by employing two variables. Social or generalised trust
34 (horizontal trust) draws upon agents’ experiences in the fields. In turn, perceived fairness,
35 helpfulness, and trustworthiness of other individuals may indicate the volume of social capital
36 from a Bourdieusian perspective (1997), that is, not only the number of connections but also
37 how/whether those connections are helpful, fair, or trustworthy. Similarly, institutional trust
38 (vertical trust) –averaged trust in politicians, political parties, country’s government, legal
39 system, police, the European parliament, and the United Nations– has also been suggested to
40 measure individuals’ social capital. Both types of trust have been found to follow a social
41 class/relative income pattern (Carmo and Nunes, 2013; Fischer and Torgler, 2013), which
42 makes them suitable to test our hypotheses. The two indexes range from 0 (no trust at all) to
43 10 (complete trust) and appear to be fit for purpose (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.77 and 0.90).
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3 Finally, symbolic capital signals an individual's social importance or reputation, that is,
4 whether an individual is 'visible', loved, or invited (Bourdieu, 2000). Its volume depends
5 heavily upon the other forms of capital, for any form of capital may become symbolic "when
6 it is misrecognised as capital" (Bourdieu, 2000: 242). We, in turn, use two variables. On the
7 one hand, participation in social activities may demonstrate an individual's 'visibility' and
8 importance. Carmo and Nunes (2013) found that its distribution is linked to social class
9 positions. On the other hand, Bourdieu (2000) argues that the distribution of symbolic capital
10 is the distribution of meaning or reasons for living. Thus, we include life satisfaction (range
11 0-10) –with life as a whole, the national government, the present state of the economy and the
12 way democracy works in a country (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.79)– as a proxy of such symbolic
13 capital.

29 **The individual *habitus***

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32 Individuals' values, religiosity, and political orientation are included in Model 2. To assess
33 the effects of values, we use the human values scale, which forms part of the ESS core
34 questionnaire. The scale includes verbal portraits of 21 individuals that capture different
35 aspects of ten value types specified by the theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992) and
36 measured using a 6-point Likert scale. To ease the interpretation, we reverse the coding so that
37 the higher the score of items that represent a specific value, the more importance on that value
38 the respondent places. The correction for individual differences in scale use is also
39 implemented when calculating value priorities (Schwartz *et al.*, 1997).

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41 Since employing higher-order values that combine the ten value types into four can be justified
42 both methodologically (better discriminant validity) and theoretically (the division of the
43 continuum is arbitrary and fewer values are also possible) (Davidov *et al.*, 2008; Kulin and
44 Meuleman, 2015), we work with two higher-order values. On the one hand, we employ self-

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3 transcendence values that measure welfare values such as equality, social justice, tolerance,
4 and welfare of all individuals (Kulin and Meuleman, 2015; Schwartz, 1992). On the other
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7 hand, in order to capture traditional familistic values, we use conservation values that depict
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10 ideas of social order and its preservation, subordination to one's traditions, and obedience to
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13 authority such as parents or elders (Schwartz, 1992).

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16 To measure religiosity, we construct an index of two items: frequency of religious service
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19 attendance and of praying (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.79). This captures individuals' religious
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22 behaviour, and we argue, commitment better than self-identification with a particular religion
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25 or self-reported religiosity, which may be affected by cultural norms and expectations. For
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28 political ideology, we do not employ the left-right scale due to high cross-country and inter-
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31 individual variation as to how people understand the concepts 'left' and 'right', both of which
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34 appear to be "too abstract for many" (Bauer *et al.*, 2017: 572). Instead, we rely upon more
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37 specific questions about inequality and social benefits/services (Bauer *et al.*, 2017; Habibov
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et al., 2019).

37 After running exploratory factor analysis, we construct three index variables (Cronbach's
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Alpha = 0.73, 0.67, and 0.61): perceived threats of social policies (social benefits/services
make people lazy; make people less willing to care for one another; place too great strain on
the economy; cost businesses too much in taxes); perceived opportunities of social policies
(social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty; lead to a more equal society); and
inequality beliefs (large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts; for
fair society, differences in standard of living should be small; government should reduce
differences in income levels). All of them range from 1, interpreted as 'left', to 5, interpreted
as 'right' (the coding is reversed for some variables). The conducted robustness tests confirm
that these variables are better predictors than the left-right scale.

Control variables

We control for individual characteristics that may result in a greater risk of facing reconciliation issues: gender, age, domicile (living in a big city, small city and town, or village and countryside); having children with the youngest aged 0-2 or 3-14 years old; and household employment status interacted with gender (in full employment; male as the main breadwinner; female as the main breadwinner; in part-time employment; and other households). We also account for respondents' occupations and employment relations by means of an indicator of occupational status by Oesch (2006). Finally, we include country dummies to control for unmeasured country-level socio-political and cultural factors.

RESULTS

Overall levels of willingness to pay for additional services for working parents appear to coincide inversely with the generosity of public reconciliation policies and the commitment of employers in providing occupational welfare. The highest support (61-63%) is found in the first (Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Ireland) and second (Portugal and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)) regimes. The support, however, decreases in the Nordic countries (47%). Meanwhile, the analysis of logistic regressions confirms varying patterns of welfare attitudes between the regimes.

[Table I around here]

In accordance with hypothesis 1A (Table I, Model 1), the dominant groups in several care regimes are less willing to pay more for reconciliation policies, which, from the Bourdieusian perspective, is to preserve their social positions and which is in line with some past research on welfare attitudes (Staerklé *et al.*, 2012). Yet, hypothesis 1B is supported more extensively. And whilst some of such effects are lost in Model 2, that is, once we introduce the normative

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3 dimension, others remain, which lends support to our hypotheses regarding the social
4 reproduction. That is, social conditionings prove to be strong notwithstanding individual
5 trajectories.
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11 Hypothesis 1A continues to be supported in Portugal and CEECs (cultural capital), and in the
12 Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (economic and symbolic capital). In the
13 former regime, which features high affordability but meagre availability of formal childcare,
14 individuals with more cultural capital are likely to have better knowledge and skills to
15 manoeuvre the system, and in turn, secure limited but affordable services. Similarly,
16 individuals with more economic resources or symbolic capital measured by participation in
17 social activities, which might be economic capital transformed into symbolic, are better placed
18 to afford very costly but relatively available childcare in the Liberal regime.
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31 In sum, in both of these regimes, extending reconciliation policies is not perceived to improve
32 individuals' position, but the reverse, for their position is always understood in relation to
33 other positions and "the distance [...] that separates it from them" (Bourdieu, 2000: 134).
34 Individuals with more economic capital are also less supportive of more spending for
35 reconciliation policies in Spain, Germany, and France, which was similarly confirmed by
36 Neimanns and Busemeyer (2021). Yet, such an effect disappears once we introduce the
37 normative dimension.
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48 On the other hand, hypothesis 1B, to a lesser or greater extent, remains supported in all care
49 regimes. Put differently, some of the dominant groups in Europe perceive better reconciliation
50 policies as advantageous in terms of their position maximisation. An alternative interpretation
51 could be the dominated groups' intention to maintain their social position, which could be lost
52 due to extra taxes (economic motives). That is, as Taylor-Gooby (2011: 158) notes, "[t]hose
53 lower in social status are more likely to be concerned about the impact in terms of cost". First,
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3 cultural capital is associated positively with welfare support in the fourth and fifth care
4 regimes. Individuals with more cultural capital might be better placed to see how
5 reconciliation policies may be advantageous to them or to their social networks.
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11 Likewise, social capital –generalised or institutional trust– generates pro-social attitudes, that
12 is, support for redistribution policies in all but the third care regime, where such effect is not
13 found. Since trusting individuals demonstrate more mutual solidarity, reciprocity, and
14 collective orientation (Habibov *et al.*, 2019), they may be more willing to ‘give’ or ‘invest’
15 into other people through, for example, higher taxes, which can, in turn, confirm or maximise
16 their social positions through their improved chances to cumulate social capital (more time to
17 maintain/increase their ‘useful’ social connections due to their own better reconciliation or
18 more social connections due to others’ better reconciliation).
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30 Such effects of generalised and institutional trust are well evidenced (Habibov *et al.*, 2019;
31 Lachapelle *et al.*, 2021), although some research demonstrates more support for our hypothesis
32 1A (Staerklé *et al.*, 2012). These results also point to the importance of political trust-building
33 in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have historically been low-trust societies
34 (Doblytė, 2022; Habibov *et al.*, 2019; Mishler and Rose, 2001). In these countries, the success
35 of welfare reforms may rely heavily upon the efforts of nurturing institutional trust, which
36 appears to be rooted in the perceived institutional performance and extension of corrupt
37 practices (Mishler and Rose, 2001).
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49 In the Nordic countries, however, the relative homogeneity in terms of high trust towards
50 institutions and other people (Piterová and Vyroost, 2019) may have led to a less clear pattern
51 of welfare support. Likewise, lower levels of inequality and less widespread poverty risks in
52 these countries (Kulin and Svallfors, 2013) suggest higher levels of socio-economic
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3 homogeneity within their populations, which could also lead to fewer differences in welfare
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5 support between social groups.
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9 In addition, individuals with accumulated symbolic capital –through participation in social
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11 activities or life satisfaction– are more supportive of reconciliation policies in all but the fifth
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13 care regime, where such effect is negative. In other words, individuals who are happier and
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15 more satisfied with their life are more likely to bet or ‘sacrifice’ for the common good. Wang
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17 and Kim (2021), who study public attitudes towards immigrants in Europe, also confirm the
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19 importance of life satisfaction in attitude formation. Given that symbolic capital “also means
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21 possessing the power to recognise, to consecrate, to state, with success, what merits being
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23 known and recognised” (Bourdieu, 2000: 242), its differential effect in the liberal countries
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25 compared to the rest of Europe suggests that individualism and self-reliance may dominate
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27 and in turn shape the norms regarding childcare and working parents/mothers.
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32 Nevertheless, the highly significant effects of values, political ideology, and religiosity –albeit
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34 to varying degrees across the regimes– signal the salience of dispositions acquired through
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36 individual trajectories that go beyond individuals’ social positions. While the effects of
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38 variables that define political ideology are in accordance with our expectations and with prior
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40 research (e.g., Taylor-Gooby, 2011), they appear to be stronger in the Nordic countries. In
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42 particular, perceived threats of social policies in terms of economic strain or societal change
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44 and inequality beliefs –that is, attitudes towards more contested issues than the capabilities of
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46 social policies to prevent poverty or lead to a more equal society– demonstrate strong
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48 significant effects in this regime.
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53 Similarly, religious behaviour proves to be important in attitude formation, although the effect
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55 is conflicting across the regimes. In the Nordic countries, as well as Austria, Belgium, Ireland,
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57 and Italy, the effect is negative: the more religious an individual is, the less willing they are to
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3 support reconciliation policies that may be perceived as a threat to traditional forms of care
4 and social protection. In addition, Protestants, who are a dominant religious group in the
5 Nordic countries, may hold less supportive attitudes due to the teachings of “individualism
6 and market outcomes as reflective of moral worth” (VanHeuvelen, 2014: 271).
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13 In Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, and CEECs, individuals who pray and/or attend service
14 more frequently are more supportive, however. All but Germany and Estonia are
15 predominantly Catholic countries, and committed Catholics may be exposed to the Catholic
16 teachings of compassion and importance placed on the community and collective
17 responsibility more so than their unaffiliated or non-practising peers (VanHeuvelen, 2014). In
18 this puzzle, nevertheless, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Italy remain somewhat an outlier:
19 they are also Catholic countries, but their religious residents demonstrate negative attitudes
20 towards additional spending for reconciliation policies. Competing religion’s influences of
21 pro-social values and culturally-based conservative identity that are reinforced by religious
22 behaviour may have different weights across the regimes because of differential welfare state
23 structure and generosity (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019).
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39 Finally, values demonstrate rather limited importance in attitude formation. They appear to be
40 significant solely in the first and fourth care regimes, that is the regimes that most resemble
41 the male-breadwinner model. Conservation values, which prioritise the social order and resist
42 change, show a negative effect in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Italy. In the meantime,
43 individuals that embrace equality or social justice tend to be more supportive of the common
44 good in France, Germany, and Spain but less supportive in the former countries (Regime 1).
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54 Whilst both regimes resemble the male-breadwinner model more so than other clusters, the
55 contrary effect of self-transcendence values may signal diverging cultural ideas of the family
56 or motherhood. We hypothesise that the family is perceived as the ‘adequate’ care provider
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3 more so in the first than in the fourth care regime. Embracing self-transcendence values, then,
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5 “might result in support for policies of family income protection but not necessarily for public
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7 care services” (Doblytė and Tejero, 2021: 16). Whilst maternal employment is low in both
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9 regimes, the proportion of children using informal childcare provided by the extended family
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11 in the first regime doubles the proportion in the fourth cluster. Further, the European Values
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13 Study in 2017 confirms the salience of the traditional gender roles at least in two out of four
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15 countries in the first cluster: 50% in Austria and 52% in Italy agree that children suffer if their
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17 mothers work (compared to 26% in Spain, 30% in France, and 32% in Germany).
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23 In sum, the multivariate analysis of willingness to pay for extending reconciliation policies
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25 demonstrates support for our hypotheses built upon the Bourdieusian theory of *habitus* and
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27 social reproduction. Yet, such relations appear to be imperfect and partial. Given the
28
29 complexity of individuals’ attitudes, this comes as no surprise. The social reality is open,
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31 dynamic, and emergent. Thus, there are undoubtedly many factors that were not measured at
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33 the individual or country levels, but that shape attitudes towards redistribution. Our findings,
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35 however, signal the importance of social/class *habitus*, as well as of individual *habitus* that is
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37 partially contingent upon social conditionings but also depends on unique individual
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39 trajectories throughout the fields.
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44 CONCLUSIONS

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47 In this article, we build upon the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 2000) and hypothesise that
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49 agents’ economic, cultural, social, or symbolic capital “as a potential capacity to produce
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51 profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form” (Bourdieu, 1997: 46) will shape
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53 their welfare attitudes so that their dominant social positions are preserved or improved. Thus,
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55 their support will depend on whether they perceive extra services or benefits for working
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57 parents as an opportunity to cumulate capital that is greater than, or as great as, economic
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3 capital lost in transaction (higher taxes). This capital convertibility principle is “the basis of
4 the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the position occupied in social
5 space)” (Bourdieu, 1997: 54), and agents “do not act in an exclusively utilitarian way, but in
6 a useful way” by ‘choosing’ practices “that are most practical for them” (Papilloud, 2018:
7 112).

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16 On the other hand, individual trajectories, which are socially structured but singular, also form
17 their *habitus* through the embodiment of beliefs or values that may result in supporting the
18 common good notwithstanding their social positions and interests. Put differently, *habitus* “is
19 not necessarily coherent and unified” (Wacquant, 2016: 68). We, therefore, expect that such
20 individual *habitus* –operationalised as values, political ideology, and religiosity– will mediate
21 the effects of capitals, albeit solely to some degree due to singularity of individual trajectories.

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The results, in turn, lend some weight to the principles of both sociation and individuation in
habitus formation, that is, not only to the interest-based explanations (the reproduction of
social hierarchy) but also to the common good. Individuals are “neither *Homo Economicus*
nor *Homo Sociologicus* alone” (Kangas, 1997: 478). In other words, welfare attitudes are
shaped not only by interests of reproducing or maximising social positions but also by more
reflexive propensities to think about the common good, that is, about the family/gender roles
and the welfare state.

The hypothesis that the dominant groups will be less supportive of change for the current field
logic guarantees their dominant position is partially supported in Portugal and CEECs –the
regime with public childcare that is highly affordable but less available– and in the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom –the regime with very costly yet available
childcare. That is, those who are better equipped to navigate the limited system (cultural
capital) in the former regime and those who afford (economic capital) or are likely to afford

(symbolic capital that can be economic capital “misrecognised as capital” (Bourdieu, 2000: 242)) costly services in the latter regime prefer status quo, which benefits them.

Yet, our expectation that the dominant groups will be more in favour of change because of position maximisation directly (better services accumulate them more capital) or indirectly (symbolic recognition by other groups) finds more support than the aforementioned hypothesis. Notably, social capital –interpersonal/generalised or institutional trust– consistently influence welfare support in nearly all regimes. Individuals are more willing to ‘give’ when they believe that “other citizens will also comply” (Lachapelle *et al.*, 2021: 537) or that institutions will redistribute additional taxes fairly; that is, they are perceived to be legitimate and competent.

Symbolic capital –“[o]ne of the most unequal of all distributions, and probably, in any case, the most cruel” (Bourdieu, 2000: 241)– likewise proves to play an important role in attitude formation. In general, the more satisfied people are with their life or the more invited/‘visible’ they feel, the more willing they are to spend more on redistribution. Wang and Kim (2021) argue that life satisfaction is a condition of moving from materialist to post-materialist values, which result in higher tolerance and acceptance of other groups, as well as support for greater gender equality. Yet, such an effect is inversed in the Liberal countries, signalling the salience of self-reliant or individualistic orientation amongst the dominant groups.

Finally, individual *habitus* measured at the normative level appears to partially mediate between the social position and position-takings (welfare attitudes); that is, it is partially contingent upon the social position. Yet, many of capital effects remain along with the associations between values, political ideology or religiosity, on the one hand, and welfare attitudes, on the other. This signals that social *habitus* and individual *habitus* do not always coincide, confirming the influence of both social positioning and individual trajectories across

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3 time and space; that is, the cognitive structures are “inscribed in bodies by both collective
4 history (phylogenesis) and individual history (ontogenesis)” (Bourdieu, 1994: 14).
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9 In brief, individuals who embrace left-wing ideals support reconciliation policies and their
10 transformation in all regimes, to a lesser or greater extent. Likewise, religion continues to play
11 its role in structuring attitudes towards redistribution, albeit in opposite directions between the
12 care regimes. This could signal a rather nuanced trade-off between religion’s pro-social and
13 conservative orientations (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019). As expected, the effects of
14 normative dimension appear to be more significant in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Italy, on
15 the one hand, and France, Germany, and Spain, on the other –that is, the regimes that can be
16 viewed as the male breadwinner cultures with the family being traditionally highly valued at
17 the normative level. However, the patterns of support –the role of religiosity and values such
18 as equality, social justice or welfare– differ between the two regimes.
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33 The formulation of the question in the double-earner/double-carer fashion suggests the
34 disruption of traditional gender roles rather than their continuity. Thus, the positive effects of
35 religiosity and self-transcendence values in France, Germany, and Spain may signal the
36 changing ideals towards the family and mothers, and that familistic solidarity “might be strong
37 because the state, which is expected to help, is often absent” (Ganjour and Widmer, 2016:
38 215). In Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Italy, nonetheless, such individuals appear to embrace
39 the male breadwinner culture and are in turn satisfied with current care provision that limits
40 mothers’ capabilities to reconcile family and work roles, and as such, reproduces the
41 traditional division of gender roles. Nevertheless, a better understanding of such differences
42 between these two groups of countries, which *a priori* seem similar culturally and
43 institutionally, indicates an interesting future research direction.
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3 Future research could also focus on a better understanding of how the different forms of capital
4 might be operationalised. In this article, our choice of variables was restricted by the survey's
5 design, and in turn, could be improved. Likewise, whilst the article contributes to the literature
6 by demonstrating the utility of the Bourdieusian perspective in the study of welfare attitudes
7 towards reconciliation policies, studies in the future could advance this theoretical framework
8 by analysing other fields of redistribution. Similarly, a more contextualised analysis on a case-
9 by-case basis could be more appropriate in order to influence national policies. Finally, since
10 the Bourdieusian theory is relatively untapped in the literature concerning welfare attitudes,
11 comparing the results with other studies has been challenging. Future research could therefore
12 facilitate comparability.
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27 In sum, the Bourdieusian approach unites the principles of sociation and individuation in
28 *habitus* formation, on the one hand, and the objective logic of the social reality, which shapes
29 a range of possible strategies in a particular field, on the other. The interplay between such
30 embodied and objectified structures underpins individuals' attitudes. The article also suggests
31 that, although the similarities in effects between the care regimes may signal converging
32 welfare attitudes in Europe, marked differences in attitude formation remain. This confirms
33 that the role of class and individual *habitus* is context-dependent or mediated by the practices
34 of the state, the employer, and the family. By analysing such differences, we study "tensions
35 between the pursuit of self-interest and the norm-based behaviour that aims for the common
36 good" (Kangas, 1997: 476) and reveal in what circumstances and contexts one or another side
37 of human behaviour becomes salient.
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


Figure 1. Selected standardised measures (z-scores) by care regime.

Table I. The role of social/class and individual habitus in support for spending more on social benefits and services to facilitate work-family reconciliation (odds ratios).

| | | AT BE IE IT (1) | CZ EE HU LT PL PT SI (2) | FI IS NO SE (3) | FR DE ES (4) | NL CH GB (5) |
|---|--|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| MODEL 1 | | | | | | |
| Subjective economic capital (ref. living comfortable on present income) | Coping on present income | 0.984 | 0.947 | 1.078 | 1.020 | 1.191*** |
| | Difficult/very difficult on present income | 0.720*** | 0.903 | 1.100 | 1.113* | 1.127 |
| Years in education | | 1.001 | 0.978* | 1.047** | 1.020*** | 1.042*** |
| Generalised/social trust | | 1.032* | 0.996 | 1.041 | 1.055*** | 1.055*** |
| Institutional trust | | 1.037* | 1.052** | 1.009 | 1.106*** | 1.094*** |
| Participation in social activities (ref. high) | Moderate | 0.886 | 1.108 | 0.977 | 0.955 | 1.226*** |
| | Low | 0.800** | 1.110 | 1.109 | 0.813*** | 1.003 |
| Satisfaction | | 1.059** | 1.045** | 1.074 | 1.005 | 0.925*** |
| <i>Constant</i> | | 0.690 | 1.057 | 0.119*** | 0.666** | 0.458*** |
| MODEL 2 | | | | | | |
| Subjective economic capital (ref. living comfortable on present income) | Coping on present income | 0.937 | 0.956 | 0.985 | 1.001 | 1.130** |
| | Difficult/very difficult on present income | 0.692*** | 0.911 | 0.927 | 1.048 | 1.072 |
| Years in education | | 1.005 | 0.980* | 1.029 | 1.017*** | 1.033*** |
| Generalised/social trust | | 1.036* | 0.988 | 1.016 | 1.032** | 1.019 |
| Institutional trust | | 1.037 | 1.042* | 0.980 | 1.107*** | 1.054** |
| Participation in social activities (ref. high) | Moderate | 0.970 | 1.138 | 0.959 | 0.949 | 1.199** |
| | Low | 0.906 | 1.140 | 1.076 | 0.816*** | 0.985 |
| Satisfaction | | 1.054** | 1.043* | 1.107* | 1.024 | 0.992 |
| Self-transcendence values | | 0.883* | 1.088 | 1.089 | 1.106*** | 1.080 |
| Conservation values | | 0.782*** | 0.938 | 1.000 | 0.970 | 0.979 |
| Threats of social policies | | 1.065 | 0.856*** | 0.772*** | 0.936*** | 0.861*** |
| Opportunities of social policies | | 0.875*** | 0.862*** | 0.999 | 0.890*** | 0.863*** |
| Inequality beliefs | | 0.762*** | 1.015 | 0.614*** | 0.814*** | 0.691*** |
| Religiosity | | 0.951** | 1.045* | 0.906** | 1.027** | 1.008 |
| <i>Constant</i> | | 1.915* | 1.874 | 2.596 | 1.561** | 2.653*** |

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Control variables: gender; age; domicile; having children aged 0-2 or 3-14; household employment status; occupational status; country dummy.

Source: Own calculations, ESS8.